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KEVIN L. BRADY
The Value of Human Life:
A Case for Altruism
ABSTRACT
The "value of statistical life" is an estimate of the monetary
benefits of preventing the death of an unidentified person. It is
the maximum amount government agencies will pay to save one
life. Current value-of-statistical-life estimates are determined by
society's willingness to pay (VTP) to eliminate private health
risks. Unfortunately, agencies ignore society's WTP to eliminate
others' health risks. There are two possible justifications. First, it
may be that altruism does not exist: Peter is not willing to pay
anything to save Paul's life. However, research evidence indicates
that altruism does in fact exist. Second, some economists argue
that accounting for altruism lowers social welfare because of the
increased cost of saving more lives. This argument fails to
consider an important form of paternalistic altruism: safety-
focused altruism, in which Peter is willing to pay more for
improvements in Paul's safety than for improvements in other
aspects of Paul's well-being. If both rationalizations for excluding
altruism are incorrect, policymakers face an unpalatable
possibility: current life valuation methods are incomplete, and
economically efficient environmental and health regulations are
unnecessarily being rejected. If this is the case, policymakers
should increase the value of statistical life to account for altruism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many government policies prevent deaths. The Consumer
Product Safety Commission's (CPSC) regulation of space heaters, for
example, saves 63 lives annually, while the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) management of asbestos saves 10.1 Ninety percent of the
Clean Air Act's benefits are prevented deaths.2 Life-saving programs are
* Economics Department, Brigham Young University, Idaho.
I. John F. Morall III, Saving Lives: A Review of the Record, 27 J. RisK & UNCERTAINTY
221, 223 (2003).
2. U.S. EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACr: 1990 To 2010 101 (1999),
available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect8l2/1990-2010/chapll3O.pdf (estimating that
"$100 billion of the $110 billion total-benefit estimate in 2010, or roughly 90 percent, is
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desirable. Resources are, however, limited. It is impossible to avoid all
accidental deaths.
How do government agencies determine the amount to spend
on life-saving programs? Most agencies rely on the value of statistical
life.3 The value of statistical life approximates the dollar value of
preventing a single death.4 Value-of-statistical-life estimates vary across
government agencies. The EPA spends up to $6.1 million to prevent one
expected death.5 CPSC spends $5 million.6
Most government-sponsored safety programs entail uncertainty
and anonymity. For instance, it is impossible to know whose lives are
prolonged through air quality improvements.7 As a result, cost-benefit
analysis (CBA) of general safety improvements requires knowledge of
the value of preventing an unidentified or statistical death. In
neoclassical economics, the value of an action is equal to society's
willingness to pay (WTP) for that action.8 The value of statistical life
approximates society's WTP to prevent anonymous deaths.9
Policymakers use value-of-statistical-life estimates to value public
risk reductions. These estimates are based on numerous risk studies.
Most of these studies, however, derive WTP for reductions in private
risks only. Hence, in practice, policymakers value public risk-reduction
programs with private WTP estimates.10 This is a subtle but important
point. The current approach ignores altruism and adopts one of two
attributable to reductions in premature mortality associated with reductions in ambient
particulate matter and associated criteria pollutants").
3. The acronym VSL is commonly used in place of "value of statistical life," a conven-
tion I eschew in this essay. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54
DUKE L.J. 385, 385 (2004) ("Each government agency uses a uniform figure to measure the
value of a statistical life (VSL).").
4. See Anna Alberini, What Is a Life Worth? Robustness of VSL Values from Contingent
Valuation Surveys, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 783, 783 (2005) ("The [value of statistical life] is a key
input for computing the mortality benefits of environmental and safety policies that save
lives.").
5. U.S. EPA, AGENCY GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 90 (2000),
available at http://yosemitel.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages/Guidelines.html/$file/
Guidelines.pdf.
6. Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 189, 191
(2000).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 24-26.
8. See BRIAN R. BINGER & ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, MICROECONOMICS WITH CALCULUS,
201-03 (2nd ed. 1998) or any standard microeconomics textbook.
9. See W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
RISK 39, 69 (1992).
10. See infra Part I.B. By way of definition, public risk reductions, such as
improvements in air quality, apply to everyone; private risk reductions, such as seatbelts,
affect only the direct consumer.
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implicit assumptions: either there is no disparity between WTP for
reductions in private and public risks, or the gap is inconsequential.
Throughout, I refer to these two assumptions as the anti-altruism
assumptions.
The first assumption implies that people are not willing to pay to
improve the safety of others, including family members and friends. This
supposition is excessively parochial. Altruism exists if "personal welfare
is affected by at least one other person's well-being."" Parents
demonstrate altruism when they help their children cross the street,
grandparents when they offer gifts to their posterity. People are
concerned with the welfare of those they know. Are they similarly
concerned with the welfare of anonymous persons? This question is
discussed below.1 2
The second anti-altruism assumption, the idea that policymakers
should ignore altruism even if it exists, also deserves attention.
Professors Bergstrom' 3 and Milgrom14 maintain that both altruists' and
non-altruists' WTP for public safety improvements are equivalent if
people are non-paternalistic -that is, Peter's welfare is affected by what
Paul values, not by what he feels Paul should value.'5 Thus, they insist,
policymakers should ignore altruism in risk valuation.16 Nevertheless, as
noted below, their theory relies on a restrictive definition of altruism.17
The objective of this essay is to examine critically both anti-
altruism assumptions. As it stands, one person's WTP to prevent
another's death does not influence government spending on safety
improvements. Is this approach correct? Should policymakers adjust the
value of statistical life to incorporate altruistic concerns? If both anti-
altruism assumptions are false, society's WTP for reductions in public
risks, rather than its WTP for private risk reductions, should determine
the value of statistical life, and policymakers should increase this value
to account for altruism. These questions are crucial for they influence
decisions that prevent actual deaths.
II. THE MIT DICIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 14 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed.
1992) [hereinafter MIT DICIONARY].
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. Theodore C. Bergstrom, When Is a Man's Life Worth More Than His Human Capital, in
THE VALUE OF LIFE AND SAFETY: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE HELD BY THE GENEVA
ASSOCIATION 3, 16-18 (M.W. Jones-Lee ed., 1982).
14. Paul Milgrom, Is Sympathy an Economic Value? Philosophy, Economics, and the
Contingent Valuation Method, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 417 (O.A.
Hausman ed., 1993).
15. Bergstrom, supra note 13, at 17.
16. Id. at 18 (arguing that to account for altruism "would lead to inefficiency").
17. See infra Part lI.B.1.
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Part II provides a brief evaluation of historical attempts to value
life, including recent efforts involving the value of statistical life. Part III
reviews the literature and evidence on the existence of altruism and
explores its potential role in determining the value of life. It also
considers and rejects both anti-altruism assumptions, concluding that
government agencies should increase value-of-statistical-life estimates.
Professor Jones-Lee posits that the altruism-adjusted value of statistical
life is 10 to 40 points greater than current values.18 Part IV revaluates two
recent EPA analyses using Jones-Lee's suggested adjustment. The results
demonstrate that the failure to consider altruism can have a substantive
impact on which programs are deemed economically feasible.
Mathematical formulations have been relegated to the Appendix.
Unfortunately, as described below, economists disagree on the
relative magnitude and sign of potential disparities between private and
public WTP values; further research is justified. On the balance,
however, I contend that there is sufficient evidence to warrant the
augmentation of current value-of-statistical-life estimates.
II. WHAT IS A LIFE WORTH?
In the 1930s, government agencies proposed numerous federal
projects, largely as a result of Roosevelt's New Deal.19 CBA soon became
popular, especially for water-related developments. 20 Within a few
decades, many federal and state agencies, as well as Congress, began to
require full analyses prior to approving major government actions. 21
Several U.S. presidents issued executive orders urging federal agencies
to use CBA.22 CBA's role quickly extended beyond simple water projects.
CBA is a tool that compares the expected costs and benefits of
programs by converting both into dollars, a common unit of
measurement. If total benefits exceed costs, projects have positive net
18. M.W. Jones-Lee, Paternalistic Altruism and the Value of Statistical Life, 102 ECON. J.
80, 89 (1992).
19. See A.R. Prest & R. Turvey, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 75 ECON. J. 683, 684
(1965).
20. See id.
21. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 386 (citing STEPHEN BREYER Er AL., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND REGULATORY PoLIcY 120-35 (5th ed. 2002); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2000); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2605(c)(1) (2000); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(c) (2000)).
22. Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton have signed executive orders concerning
CBA. Exec. Order No. 12,044,43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 24,1978); Exec. Order No. 12,291,46
Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb, 19,1981); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
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benefits and are feasible.23 Many costs and benefits are not, however,
readily expressed in dollars and cents.
As noted above, countless government programs prevent
premature deaths. The EPA's National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS), for example, establish acceptable levels of air pollutants
throughout the United States.24 These standards force polluters to reduce
their emissions of potentially lethal toxins such as lead, carbon
monoxide, and particulate matter (PM2.5). By tightening PM2.5 standards
20 percent over the next decade,25 the EPA will prevent up to 7,100
premature deaths per year.26 Nevertheless, tighter air quality standards
impose costs on activities that produce PM2.5, including automobile
operation and power generation. In evaluating such regulations, cost-
benefit analysts must assign an explicit value to the benefits of
premature death prevention. Otherwise, they implicitly assign it a value
of zero. The value of human life is, understandably, difficult to quantify.
Until the 1960s, the value of life was estimated based on the
discounted sum of expected future income. 27 Although such values are
still used to determine compensation in wrongful death lawsuits,2s
23. Although cost-benefit comparisons may seem noncontroversial, numerous critics
have attacked CBA. Much of the debate centers on the notion of potential Pareto
improvements. According to this concept, one resource allocation is preferable to another if
"the gainers from change are hypothetically able to compensate those who lose." MIT
DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 338. Many reject potential Pareto improvements as valid
efficiency measures. See John M. Gowdy, The Revolution in Welfare Economics and Its
Implications for Environmental Valuation and Policy, 80 LAND ECON. 238, 242-45 (2004) (citing
T. Scitovsky, Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. ECON. STUD. 77 (1941))
(claiming that it is not necessarily possible to prove that one allocation is unequivocally
preferable to another); FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRIcELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRIcE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 34-35 (2004) (criticizing the idea that
gainers are not required to compensate losers); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE
L.J. 1911 (1999) (noting that the principle of non-compensation is especially troubling when
the gains come now and the losses come far in the future, as is the case with policies
concerning climate change or nuclear waste storage).
24. U.S. EPA, 2008 NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR GROUND-LEVEL
OzONE, EXECuTnVE SUMMARY, 1 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnecasl/regdata/
RIAs/0-ozoneriaexecsum.pdf.
25. A 20-percent reduction would imply that permissible PM2.5 levels are lowered
from the current standard of 0.84 parts per million to 0.65 parts per million. See id. at ES-5.
26. Id. at ES-6.
27. See, e.g., Dorothy P. Rice & Barbara S. Cooper, The Economic Value of Human Life, 57
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1954, 1955 (1967).
28. See generally W. Cris Lewis & Tyler J. Bowles, Assessing Economic Damages in
Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Litigation: The State of Utah, 18 J. FORENSIc EcoN. 227
(2006); Tyler J. Bowles et al., Assessing Economic Damages in Personal Injury and Wrongful
Death Litigation: The State of Idaho, 17 J. FORENSIC ECON. 415 (2005).
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economists realized that this approach is not consistent with the
standard economic concept of value.29
A. Economic Value and the Value of Identified Lives
In neoclassical economic theory, WTP determines the value or
benefits of an action. The economic value of John Doe's life is the sum of
society's WTP to prevent his death. 30 Valuing actual lives using the WTP
approach is difficult and perhaps meaningless. How much are people
willing to pay to prevent their children's deaths? Most parents would
forfeit everything they own. Alternatively, how much must people be
paid to accept death? For most, a suitable number does not exist.31 The
irreversibility of death makes it nearly impossible to value. Due to these
difficulties, some economists feel that life should not be valued
holistically.32 Indeed, current life-valuation attempts apply a piecemeal
approach first proposed by economist Gary Fromm in 1965. 33
Fromm argued that lives could be valued by observing people's
behaviors towards small changes in risk: "[Because people] expose
themselves to danger in their avocations.. .for personal gain... [they]
implicitly assign a value to their lives." 34 According to Fromm's example,
if the probability of dying on a commercial airplane is 1.7 in 1,000,000
and passengers are willing to pay $0.68 to eliminate this risk, they value
their lives at $400,000 ($0.68 divided by 0.0000017).'3
Fromm's claim notwithstanding, this approach cannot value
specific lives because it requires the spurious assumption that people
regard symmetric risk reductions equally, regardless of initial risk levels.
In reality, WTP varies according to the quantity of risk and baseline risk
levels.36 Though a person will pay $100 for a 0.01 percent risk reduction,
29. E.J. Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach, 79 J. POL. ECON. 687,
689-90 (1971) (claiming that "most writers have mental reservations about [the discounted-
sum approach's] validity and tend to regard it as only part of the total measurement").
30. But see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 23 (positing that life is valueless;
therefore, it is inappropriate to assign life a specific value); STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE
INcENTIvEs? ECONOMISTS AND THE ENViRONMENT (1981).
31. See, e.g., W. Michael Hanemann, Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How
Much Can They Differ? 81 AM. ECON. REv. 635 (1991) (positing that finite WTP values are
compatible with infinite willingness-to-be-paid values if substitutes are scarce or
nonexistent).
32. See, e.g., VIsCUSi, supra note 9, at 19.
33. Gary Fromm, Civil Aviation Expenditures, in MEASURING BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT
INvEsrmENr 172 (Robert Dorfman ed., 1965).
34. Id. at 193.
35. Id. at 194.
36. See Alberini, supra note 4, at 799.
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she may not pay $200 for a 0.02 percent reduction; the additional 0.01
percent reduction may be worth more or less than $100. Yet Fromm's
approach requires this supposition. As Professor Mishan later noted,
"The implied assumption of linearity, which has it that a man who
accepts $100,000 for an assignment offering him a four-to-one chance of
survival will agree to go to certain death for $500,000, is implausible, to
say the least."37 In fact, Fromm himself later criticized another economist
for relying on the same mistaken assumption.38 (He did not, however,
acknowledge that he had committed the same error three years prior.)
This method cannot value identified lives. Nevertheless, economists have
successfully used this approach to value unidentified or statistical lives.
B. The Value of Statistical Life
Risk mitigation policies prevent deaths that are anonymous, at
least ex ante. The EPA cannot identify the 7,100 people whose lives will
be spared through tighter air quality standards.39 This knowledge might
be available ex post, but such information is not accessible as decisions
are made. However, as Professor Mitchell has stated, "The principle of
consumer sovereignty suggests that policymakers should attempt to
implement the current desires of the public -clearly an objective with an
ex ante perspective." 4° According to this viewpoint, the value of
preventing unidentified deaths, not the value of preventing any specific
person's death, is relevant to expenditure decisions.41
Reductions in wide-ranging mortality risks result in reductions
in anonymous deaths. Consequently, if it is possible to determine
society's WTP for risk reductions, it is possible to estimate the benefits of
reductions in anonymous deaths. This is the purpose of the value of
statistical life, which "is the rate at which individuals are prepared to
trade off income for risk reductions... [and] is, therefore, a derivate." 42
The value of statistical life is society's equilibrium income-risk exchange rate. It
does not, strictly speaking, define the benefits of preventing a single
37. Mishan, supra note 29, at 691.
38. Gary Fromm, Comment on T. C. Schelling's Paper "The Life You Save May Be Your
Own", in PROBLEMS IN PUBUC EXPENDrruRE 166,174 (1968).
39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
40. ROBERT C. MITCHELL, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT
VALUATION METHOD 30 (1989) (emphasis added).
41. But see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 23, at 68 (arguing that the benefits of
risk-reduction programs should be measured according to the value of general risk
reductions, an ex ante perspective, and the value of actual lives saved, an ex post
perspective).
42. Alberini, supra note 4, at 784.
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death; it merely provides an estimate. Emphasizing this point, Professor
Sunstein recently stated, "there is no 'value of a statistical life'; there are
only values for the reduction of statistical risks." 43
In practice, however, the value of statistical life is not a derivate:
it is the ratio of WTP for a specific risk reduction to the absolute level of
reduction.44 For example, in a recent study, participants were willing to
pay $1,589.46 for a 0.05 percent reduction in the probability of death.45
According to these results, the estimated value of statistical life is $3.179
million. 46
I have included the calculations deriving the standard value of
statistical life in the Appendix, but there are three important theoretical
implications I would like to discuss here. First, the relationship between
the value of statistical life and income is positive. As income increases,
people attach a higher value to safety improvements. Nearly all value-of-
statistical-life studies confirm this correlation.47 EPA accordingly adjusts
the value of statistical life to account for expected income growth.48
Second, because WTP varies according to the overall probability
of death,49 the value of statistical life is a function of baseline risk levels5 °
The relationship between the value of statistical life and the overall
probability of death is positive. In CBA, policymakers typically ignore
initial risk levels. Although this tendency is undesirable, most govern-
ment programs deal with remote mortality risks. For this reason,
Professor Viscusi argues that the value of statistical life should be used
only to estimate the benefits of small changes in minute death
probabilities.51
Finally, as noted in the Appendix, the standard value-of-
statistical-life derivation assumes that personal welfare is solely a
function of income. Consequently, the well-being of others does not
influence personal welfare. This implicitly accepts the anti-altruism
assumptions mentioned in Part I: either altruism does not exist or it
43. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 392.
44. Alberini, supra note 4, at 784.
45. Anna Alberini et al., Willingness to Pay for Mortality Risk Reductions: Does Latency
Matter? 32 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 231, 241 (2006).
46. $1,589.46/0.0005 = $3.179 million. Id. at 243.
47. See, e.g., VIscusi, supra note 9; Kevin L. Brady, An Expressed Preference Determination
of College Students' Valuation of Statistical Lives: Methods and Implications, 42 COLLEGE
STUDENT J. 968 (2008).
48. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, 2008 NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR
GROuND-LEvEL OzONE, ch. 6, at 25 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnecasl/
regdata/RIAs/6-ozoneriachapter6.pdf.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
50. See infra Appendix.
51. VISCUSI, supra note 9, at 20.
[Vol. 48
A CASE FOR ALTRUISM
should be ignored. Most risk researchers follow the standard model; they
eschew altruism. For example, despite the existence of four risk WTP
estimation methods, 2 most researchers primarily rely on two WTP
elicitation techniques: compensating wage studies 3 and contingent
valuation.5 4 The first approach determines the amount of income
necessary to convince workers to accept increased on-the-job health
risks. For example, elephant handlers at the Philadelphia Zoo receive an
extra $1,000 per year because of the dangerous nature of their job.5 5
These wage differentials necessarily reveal attitudes toward changes in
risk that are exclusively private. Contingent valuation studies, which use
surveys to directly ask consumers how much they are willing to pay for
a certain good, are capable of revealing preferences toward public risks.56
However, survey administrators typically instruct respondents to con-
sider private risks only. In a recent study, researchers directed partici-
pants to "report information about their WTP for.. .risk reductions,"
instructing respondents "to think of [the] risk as their own."57 Both
methods primarily estimate WTP for reductions in private risks. And, as
noted above, government agencies use these estimates to compute the
value of statistical life and thereby determine the benefits of public risk
reductions. To demonstrate this point, it may be useful to examine the
origins of common value-of-statistical-life estimates.
The EPA's value-of-statistical-life estimate is based on Professor
Viscusi's 1993 study.5 8 This estimate relies on 26 wage differential studies
and five contingent valuation surveys.5 9 Adjusted for inflation, these 31
studies provide a mean value of statistical life of $6.1 million.6° Accord-
ingly, recent EPA studies attribute roughly $6 million to the value of
52. Alberini, supra note 4, at 783.
53. See, e.g., Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, The Quantity-adjusted Value of Life, 26
ECON. INQUIRY 386 (1988); Robert S. Smith, Compensating Wage Differentials and Public Policy:
A Review, 32 IND. & LAB. RELATIONS REV. 339 (1979); PETER DORMAN, MARKETS AND
MORTALITY: EcoNoMIcs, DANGEROUS WORK, AND THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE (1996).
54. See, e.g., Alberini et al., supra note 45; Alberini, supra note 4; Phaedra S. Corso et al.,
Valuing Mortality Risk Reduction: Using Visual Aids to Improve the Validity of Contingent
Valuation, 23 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 165 (2001); James K. Hamnitt & John D. Graham,
Willingness to Pay for Health Protection: Inadequate Sensitivity to Probability?, 18 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 33 (1999); Brady, supra note 47.
55. VISCUSI, supra note 9, at 8.
56. Per-Olov Johansson, Altruism and the Value of Statistical Life: Empirical Implications,
13 J. HEALTH ECON. 111 (1994).
57. Alberini et al., supra note 45, at 235.
58. W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. Lrr. 1912 (1993).
59. U.S. EPA, supra note 5.
60. Id.
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unidentified death prevention.61 The Federal Food and Drug Admini-
stration's value of statistical life is comparable to EPA's estimate.62 Other
major government agencies similarly value statistical lives in the range
of $5 to $6 million dollars.63 If both anti-altruism assumptions are correct,
these numbers are not accurate estimates of the value of anonymous
death prevention because they rely solely on private WTP values.
III. THE ABSENCE OF ALTRUISM
I am not the first writer to note the absence of altruism in value-
of-statistical-life calculations. Professor Mishan observed in the 1970s
that the value of a person's life is equal to her private WTP to prevent
her own death plus all others' WTP to prevent her death.64 Twenty years
later, Professor Viscusi commented, "The extent and implications of
altruistic concerns have yet to be estimated properly."65 By this time,
researchers had begun to seriously investigate the potential role of
altruism.66 Nevertheless, their results were never incorporated into
policy decisions. In 2004, economist Frank Ackerman and law professor
Lisa Heinzerling asked the critical question, "How much is it worth to
you to prevent the death of an unknown person far away?.. .The answer
cannot be deduced solely from your attitudes toward risks to yourself."
67
A. Does Altruism Exist?
1. Casual Observations
Anecdotal evidence suggests that people are willing to sacrifice
to prevent the deaths of others. In August 2007, six coal miners were
trapped underground by a partial cave-in at the Crandall Canyon
61. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 3, at 397.
62. See, e.g., Beverages: Bottled Water Arsenic Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 70,082
(proposed Dec. 2, 2004) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 165) (stating that the Federal Food and
Drug Administration "used a range of $5 to $6.5 million for the value of a statistical
life.. .This range includes the VSL of $6.1 million that EPA used in their analysis").
63. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 3, at 396-98. But see Memorandum from Kirk K. Van
Tine, Gen. Counsel & Linda Lawson, Acting Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Transp. Pol'y, U.S.
Dep't of Transp. (an. 29, 2002), available at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/Data/VSL02
guid.pdf (encouraging the Department of Transportation to use three million dollars as the
value of life).
64. Mishan, supra note 29, at 198-201.
65. VIscusi, supra note 9, at 21.
66. See infra Part HI.B.2.
67. AcKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 23, at 69-70.
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Mine.68 Because communications were cut off, administrators did not
know if those in the mine had survived the initial collapse. Many people
sacrificed time and money in a heroic effort to save the miners.
Unfortunately, these attempts were ultimately unsuccessful and three
additional rescue workers perished.69 Those involved in the rescue
efforts knew the identity of the trapped miners. The rescue workers
revealed a conspicuous WTP to prevent their deaths.
Similarly, parents accept lower salaries in exchange for medical
insurance benefits that extend to their children. It seems unreasonable to
suggest that parental welfare is not affected by the well-being of their
children. As noted above, however, most risk-reduction policies prevent
the deaths of persons that are unknown. Thus, the willingness to
sacrifice displayed by rescue workers and affectionate parents, both of
whom have an ex post perspective, does not provide a relevant estimate
of the value of preventing the deaths of unidentified persons, nor does it
demonstrate that people are indeed willing to pay for risk reductions
enjoyed by unknown persons. Therefore, before including this sort of
altruism in value-of-statistical-life calculations, we must ask, Does
altruism exist even if it is impossible to identify whose deaths, if any,
will be prevented through risk-reduction programs?
Americans donated over 15 million units of blood in 2004.70 Most
people give one unit of blood per donation. Americans therefore donated
blood on approximately 15 million occasions in 2004. Of these donations,
only 132,000 were designated for specific patients;71 all others were made
without knowledge of the eventual beneficiary. Although the motive-
tions for donating blood may be complex,72 anonymous blood donations
provide a clear answer to the previous question: people are willing to
pay to prevent the premature death of others, even if such persons
remain unidentified. Still, much of the existing empirical data is con-
flicting; as I discuss below, some results are entirely paradoxical.
68. Dan Frosh & Jennifer Lee, Rescue Halted at Mine After 3 Deaths and 6 Injuries, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/17/us/17cnd-mine.html?_r=
2&hp&oref=slogin&oref=slogin.
69. Id.
70. BARBEE WHITAKER & MARIAN SULLIVAN, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
THE 2005 NATIONWIDE BLOOD COLLECTION AND UTILIZATION SURVEY REPORT 13 (2005),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/bloodsafety/2005NBCUS.pdf.
71. Id. at19.
72. See, e.g., Shalom H. Schwartz, Normative Explanations of Helping Behavior: A Critique,
Proposal, and Empirical Test, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCH. 349 (1973) (arguing that people's
willingness to donate blood is a function of the perceived moral obligation).
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2. Empirical Evidence
If altruism exists, consumers' WTP for public safety improve-
ments should exceed their WTP for equivalent private improvements. A
group of economists recently examnined 96 empirical estimates of WTP,
most of which were elicited using contingent valuation surveys.73
According to their study, consumers are willing to pay more for private
risk reductions than public reductions.74 These results imply that, given
the choice between (a) safety improvements that strictly apply to the
individual, and (b) equivalent improvements that apply to the individual
and all others (including family members and friends), the average
person would select the former. In other words, people are misanthro-
pists, not altruists. Individual welfare increases as others experience an
increased risk of death! There are a few possible explanations for this
counterintuitive empirical result.
First, respondents who stated their WTP for risk reduction as a
private good are not the same participants who expressed WTP for risk
reduction as a public good. In fact, private and public risk surveys may
bear little resemble to one another.75 It is therefore questionable whether
the WTP values are directly comparable. After all, "[s]mall changes in
question wording.. .sometimes cause significant changes in survey
responses."76 This does not explain similar disparities in studies where
participants received near-identical surveys.77 However, improper
survey design may also lead to paradoxical results.
Researchers should urge survey participants to endogenously
consider public risks. If participants do not apply the implications of
risks to themselves, WTP bids may be vastly understated. Many surveys
fail in this regard. For example, in a recent study, researchers explicitly
stated that private risk programs would decrease the participants'
probability of dying.78 The same researchers equivocally explained the
73. Arianne de Blaeij et al., The Value of Statistical Life in Road Safety: A Meta-analysis, 35
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 973 (2003).
74. Id. at 980.
75. See, e.g., id. (examining 20 public-risk WTP estimates and 75 private-risk WTP
estimates, most of which were derived using different surveys).
76. W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through Contingent Valuation, 8 J.
ECON. PERSPECrIVES 19, 26 (1994).
77. See, e.g., Magnus Johannesson et al., The Value of Private Safety Versus the Value of
Public Safety, 13 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 263 (1996) (finding that public WTP is less than
private WTP for road safety programs); Lars Hultkrantz et al., The Value of Improved Road
Safety, 32 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 151 (2006).
78. The following private risk-reduction scenario was used:
Consider that a traffic safety device is developed which can reduce serious
accidents. It can fully prevent fatal and severe injury risk for the users of
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effects of the public risk-reduction program; they did not encourage
participants to apply the effects of the risk reduction to themselves.79
Respondents may have therefore considered the public program
primarily as an improvement in the safety of others. In this study, the
sum of private and public WTP values more accurately reflects the
altruism-adjusted value of life.s°
The original group of economists proposed a final explanation:
WTP for public risk reduction is subject to the free-rider effect.81 That is,
consumers may strategically understate their true WTP if they expect
that others will also pay. In such cases, stated public WTP values do not
equal actual WTP values, so the comparison of private and public WTP
numbers is illegitimate.
Flawed surveys therefore appear to be the likeliest explanation
for the counterintuitive results, and researchers can eliminate these
sources of bias through proper survey design. As expected, studies that
mitigate these problems yield empirical evidence supporting the
existence of altruism.
Economists Jorge Arafta and Carmelo Le6n recently surveyed
700 households to determine their WTP for reductions in the probability
of acquiring influenza.82 The sample was split into two groups. One
group stated WTP for a flu vaccine-a private risk reduction; the other
group stated WTP for a policy that reduces the overall probability of
acquiring flu-a public risk reduction.83 Both groups were asked to
assume the same absolute level of risk reduction. Researchers corrected
the first problem because the surveys were identical aside from the
specific risk-reduction question. Also, the survey explicitly instructed
this equipment within a city, e.g.[,] the urban area of Orebro. Pedestrians,
bicyclists and car users can use the device. It reduces the risk for severe
accidents within the urban area to zero only for the person that is using it; it
can not be used by others, not even within the same household.
Hultkrantz et al., supra note 77, at 157.
79. The following public risk-reduction scenario was used:
[Consider] a road traffic safety programme that will reduce the number of
fatal and severe injuries within the urban area of Orebro with 16 persons
within the urban area of Orebro during one year. The reduction applies to
pedestrians, bicyclists and car users. Outside the urban area the number of
road accidents will be unaffected.
Id. at 158.
80. See, e.g., Josephine Borghi, Aggregation Rules for Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Health
Economics Perspective, HEALTH ECON. ONLINE Doi: 10.1002/Hec.1304 (2007) (examining the
value of statistical life under varying WTP aggregation methods).
81. Blaeij et al., supra note 73, at 979.
82. Jorge E. Arafta & Carmelo J. Le6n, Willingness to Pay for Health Risk Reduction in the
Context of Altruism, 11 HEALTH ECON. 623, 624 (2002).
83. Id. at 625.
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participants to endogenously consider public risk reductions. 84 Further-
more, the researchers took steps to mitigate potential free-rider biases.85
The researchers avoided all three problems mentioned above, and their
results complied with expectations. On average, respondents were
willing to pay 14 to 24 percent more for public morbidity reductions than
for private morbidity reductions. 86 These results confirm common
intuition: altruism exists. Should policymakers disregard it?
B. Is Altruism Safety-focused?
1. Theory
As noted in the introduction, Professor Bergstrom has cogently
argued that policymakers should ignore altruistic concerns.87 Although
consumers are willing to pay to improve the safety of others, he believes
that policymakers should not increase safety expenditures. According to
Bergstrom, if government agencies were to increase the value of
statistical life to account for altruism, taxes would have to be uniformly
raised to pay for greater risk-reduction expenditures.88 The tax increase,
however, lowers overall welfare: "If the benefits to Peter of the extra
public safety must include Peter's valuation of increased safety for Paul,
then the costs to Peter of the taxes that pay for the increased safety must
include Peter's regrets for Paul's reduced consumption." 89 If taxes are
raised to pay for Peter's altruism, Paul is no longer able to purchase as
many goods and Paul's overall welfare decreases. Therefore, the
existence of altruism does not imply that agencies should increase their
estimates of the value of statistical life. Professor Milgrom later
concurred with Bergstrom's assessment. 90
Bergstrom's simple proof may be one of the primary reasons
policymakers ignore altruism in current CBAs. Nevertheless, his model
relies on a questionable assumption concerning the nature of altruism,
namely that it is neutral. Neutral altruism implies that Peter's welfare is
affected by Paul's well-being as Paul perceives it, not as Peter perceives
it.
84. Id. at 634.
85. Id. at 625 (reducing the free-rider problem by including "a provision
rule.. stressing that the preventive campaign would be carried out only if everybody
would agree to pay for the policy").
86. Id. at 630.
87. Bergstrom, supra note 13.
88. Id. at 17.
89. Id.
90. Milgrom, supra note 14.
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In 1991, Professor Jones-Lee expanded Bergstrom's model by
considering safety-focused altruism, a form of paternalistic altruism.91
Altruism is safety-focused if "[Peter's] concern for [Paul's] welfare is
solely related to [Paul's] safety and not to other determinants of [Paul's]
well-being." 92 In this case, Peter's well-being increases when Paul enjoys
greater safety, though it may remain unaffected when Paul's income
grows. If altruism is entirely safety-focused, it is not only appropriate but
necessary to include the full amount of people's WTP for the safety of others in
the valuation of statistical lives.93 Accordingly, current value-of-life
estimates are inadequate. The Appendix contains an informal proof of
this proposition. Professor Jones-Lee later demonstrated that the degree
to which one person's WTP for another's safety should affect risk
expenditure decisions depends on the likelihood that altruism deviates
from neutrality.94 He further estimated that the altruism-adjusted value
of statistical life is 10 to 40 percent greater than the value used in current
policy analyses.95 This theoretical estimate contains the 14 to 24 percent
range found by economists Arafta and Le6n.96
Professors Bergstrom's and Jones-Lee's conflicting models beg
the question: Is altruism neutral or safety-focused? The former implies
that policymakers should ignore altruism; the latter implies that
policymakers should increase the value of statistical life to account for it.
Government welfare programs may offer some insight.
2. Empirical Evidence
If altruism tends to be neutral, one would expect society to
pursue aid programs that offer cash payments, for recipients would be
free to spend aid money however they please, thereby maximizing
personal welfare as perceived by recipients. If, on the other hand, altruism
is paternalistic, society would pursue spending programs that increase
recipients' welfare as perceived by society at large. In 2002, cash payments
constituted less than 10 percent of total aid given to familiesY Most
government welfare spending instead focused on "Medicaid, food
stamps, public housing, school nutrition programs (the National School
91. M.W. Jones-Lee, Altruism and the Value of Other People's Safety, 213 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 213, 213 (1991).
92. Id. at 213-14.
93. Id. at 213 (claiming that one person's WTP for another's safety should be fully
included in the value of statistical life "if and only if altruism is exclusively safety-focused").
94. Jones-Lee, supra note 18, at 88.
95. Id. at 89.
96. Araita & Le6n, supra note 82, at 630.
97. Janet Currie, Cutting the Safety Net One Strand at a Time, in THE ECONOMIsff VOICE
194, 195 (Joseph E. Stiglitz et al. eds., 2008).
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Lunch and the School Breakfast programs), [and] WIC (Supplemental
Nutrition for Women, Infants, and Children) .... -98 Because welfare
programs center on health and nutrition, current spending levels seem to
indicate that altruism is safety-focused. A new empirical study
strengthens this proposition.
In 2007, another team of economists conducted a simple survey
to test the nature of altruism.9 9 The researchers queried 360 students,
informing participants they could donate either money or nicotine
patches to a poor diabetes patient. According to the hypothetical
scenario, the patient's WTP for nicotine patches was less than the market
price. The respondents knew that the patient preferred cash payments to
nicotine patches. Thus, "[a] pure altruist will...always prefer to donate
money," which maximizes the patient's welfare, "whereas a [safety-
focused] altruist may prefer to donate nicotine patches,"' 00 which
improves the patient's health. Ninety percent of participants offered to
donate nicotine patches instead of money.1 1 The students apparently
attempted to improve the patient's health rather than maximize his
overall welfare. These results provide strong support for the idea that
altruism is safety-focused.
Although further research is certainly encouraged, significant
evidence contradicts the anti-altruism assumptions described in Part I of
this essay. Not only does altruism exist, but it tends to be safety-focused.
Therefore, people are willing to pay to reduce the health risks of others
as well as themselves, and these higher WTP values should increase
policymakers' estimates of the value of statistical life. In Part IV, I
reexamine two recent CBA analyses using estimates of the altruism-
adjusted value of statistical life and show how the failure to account for
altruism influences which safety programs policymakers implement and
the number of deaths thereby prevented.
IV. ALTRUISM IN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
"CBA drives the environmental policy recommendations of most
economists," 102 despite the protests of many. 03 Value-of-statistical-life
estimates, which profoundly affect the expected costs and benefits,
98. Id. at 196-97.
99. Fredric Jacobsson et al., Is Altruism Paternalistic?, 117 ECON. J. 761 (2007).
100. Id. at 765.
101. Id. at 761.
102. Gowdy, supra note 23, at 241.
103. See, e.g., Alan Randall, W7zy Benefits and Costs Matter, 14 CHoicEs 38 (1999)
(endorsing CBA with specific qualifications, namely that policy decisions should not make
decisions solely on the results of CBA).
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heavily influence policymakers' attitudes towards various life-saving
programs. It is therefore important to know the true value of anonymous
death prevention.
In this part, I analyze the CBAs in two recent EPA studies. These
particular studies were selected because, first, both examine programs
that reduce mortality levels. The EPA's estimate of the value of statistical
life therefore plays an important role in each analysis. In addition, in
both studies, the costs were found to outweigh the benefits in certain
regions or under certain assumptions. As noted in Part III, Professors
Arafta, Le6n,10 4 and Jones-Lee0S performed studies suggesting that the
altruism-adjusted value of life is 10 to 40 percent greater than the value
currently used by government agencies. 10 6 I herein briefly-and
somewhat crudely -reevaluate the expected benefits of both programs
using this adjustment for altruism. The intent is to demonstrate that the
absence of altruism in these calculations can have a determinative impact
on which programs are found to be economically feasible.
A. Clean Air Act, Section 126
In standard economics, external diseconomies, often mis-
leadingly referred to simply as externalities, are activities that impose
costs on someone other than the producer.1° 7 Pollution is a classic
example. Unless polluters are liable for the costs of contaminated air and
water, harmful emissions impose external diseconomies on those who
desire a clean environment. Power plants often emit harmful pollutants.
One such pollutant is nitrogen oxide (NO.),10 8 a harmful toxin that
causes lung damage. Once released into the atmosphere, NO. can travel
via wind to adjoining areas. Congress, through the Clean Air Act, has
attempted to mitigate this external diseconomy by establishing ambient
NOx standards.9
Several Northeastern states recently filed a petition with the EPA
charging that pollution produced in neighboring areas prevented the
104. Arafia & Le6n, supra note 82.
105. Jones-Lee, supra note 18.
106. Supra text accompanying notes 86, 91-%.
107. See generally James M. Buchanan & Wn. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29
ECONOMIcA 371 (1962).
108. U.S. EPA, SECTION 126 PETITIONS: FINAL RULE REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS-
SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME: OZoNE-RELATED BENEFITS OF REGIONAL NOx EMISSION
REDUCIONS, ch. 1, at 1 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/tl/reports/
clsuppo3.pdf [hereinafter EPA SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, ch 1].
109. See generally U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPAcT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL SECTION 126
PETITION RULE (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t1/reports/126fnO.pdf.
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petitioning states from achieving acceptable NO. levels.110 Section 126 of
the Clean Air Act was drafted in response to this petition, enhancing the
EPA's ability to clean up significant sources of interstate air pollution."'
The EPA later analyzed the efficacy of Section 126 by performing a CBA
study. According to the EPA's results, roughly 80 percent of the law's
benefits are reductions in mortality risks." 2 In fact, the EPA estimated
that full compliance with the law could save 200 lives per year.113 The
EPA compared costs and benefits using two methods: the value-of-
statistical-life approach and the value-of-statistical-life-years approach.
The latter approach is similar to the method discussed throughout this
essay; it simply values years of life rather than life itself.1 4 The
implications of altruism apply equally to both methods. With the
standard approach, the EPA estimated that the program yields positive
net benefits of $200 million.115 With the alternative approach, however,
the EPA determined that the program yields negative net benefits of $300
million.116 If policymakers accept the alternative approach, they must
conclude that the program is economically infeasible.
Nevertheless, if policymakers increase expected benefits by 43
percent, net benefits are positive under both approaches.117 This adjustment
for altruism does not differ significantly from Professor Jones-Lee's upper-
end recommendation of 40 percent. In this study, the neglect of altruism
could have led policymakers to label an otherwise efficient program as
economically undesirable. Because the EPA performed this CBA ex post
and a recent Supreme Court decision indicates that the EPA cannot
consider costs in setting air quality standards, 1 8 the study's results did not
affect the decision to enact Section 126. Still, this and the example below
demonstrate that altruism can affect the outcome of CBA.
110. EPA SUPPLEMENTARY VoLUME, ch. 1, supra note 108.
Ill. Id.
112. $1,090 million/$1,360 million = 0.8015; U.S. EPA, SECTION 126 PETrIONS: FINAL
RULE REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS-SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME: OZONE-RELATED BENEFITS
OF REGIONAL NOx EMISSION REDUCTIONS, ch. 4, at 2, available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/
oarpg/tl/reports/c4suppo3.pdf [hereinafter EPA SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, ch. 4].
113. Id.
114. Economists Moore and Viscusi made the first attempt to value life years; Moore &
Viscusi, supra note 53, at 373.
115. EPA SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, ch. 4, supra note 112, at 6.
116. Id.
117. ($1,000 million - $700 million)/$700 million = 0.4286; see id.
118. EPA SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, ch. 1, supra note 108. For the Supreme Court
decision, see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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B. September 2006 Adjustment in PMzs Standards
On September 21, 2006, the EPA adjusted ambient PMzs
standards.11 9 According to scientific experts, this adjustment will prevent
1,200 to 24,000 deaths.120 Full attainment is expected to yield $18 to $22
billion net benefits-the variation depends on the discount rate. 121 The
EPA separated the results into three geographical areas: East, West, and
California. Net benefits are positive in California and Eastern states but
negative in Western states (excluding California). Although the EPA
estimated that tighter standards could prevent 100 to 1,400 deaths in the
West,122 regional costs exceed benefits by $20 to $100 million.123 This
implies that the EPA should not enforce tighter standards in the West.
Nevertheless, if the EPA increases its estimate of benefits by 2.5 to 15
percent to account for altruism, net benefits are universally positive,
even in the Western region.124 As with the previous example, the failure
to consider altruism determines whether this regulation is labeled
efficient or inefficient. The decision to consider or ignore altruism will
continue to have, in many situations, a substantive impact on which
projects and regulations government agencies pursue.
V. CONCLUSION
Altruism is pervasive in modern society. People care about
others, even anonymous persons. Why, then, does contemporaneous
economics largely ignore altruism? Economists as far back as Adam
Smith have argued that free markets allocate resources more effectively
than alternative systems.125 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
119. U.S. EPA, 2006 NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICLE
POLLUTION: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, ExECUTIVE SUMMARY, ES-1 (2006), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttnecasl/regdata/RIAs/Executive%2Summary.pdf.
120. Id. at ES-8.
121. U.S. EPA, 2006 NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICLE
POLLUTION: REGULATORY IMPACr ANALYSIS, CHAPTER 9, 9-3 (2006), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttnecasl/regdata/RIAs/Chapter%209-
Comparison%20of%20Costs%20and%20Benefits.pdf [hereinafter EPA 2006, CHAPTER 9].
122. U.S. EPA, 2006 NATIONAL AMBIENT Am QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICLE
POLLUTION: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, CHAPrER 5, 5-69 (2006), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttnecasl/regdata/RIAs/Chapter%205-Benefits.pdf.
123. EPA 2006, Chapter 9, supra note 121.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 572 (Bantam Classic 2003) (1776)
("As every individual.. labours... [h]e intends only his own gain.. .and he is in this, as in
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
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century, economists- many of whom went on to receive Nobel Prizes -
developed mathematical proofs and theorems that demonstrate the
superiority of free markets. 126 These proofs, however, depend on a
number of assumptions about consumer preferences. One such
assumption stipulates that the well-being of others does not affect
personal welfare.127 Under this assumption, altruism does not exist. If the
well-being of others does in fact affect personal welfare, free market
allocations are not necessarily optimal. The neglect of altruism is thus
rooted in the fundamental theories of microeconomics.
However, given the important distinction between neutral and
safety-focused altruism, it makes sense to ignore altruism in many
regulatory decisions. As Professor Bergstrom demonstrated, if altruistic
concerns are absolutely neutral, it is not wise to increase the value of
certain commodities to adjust for altruism, at least in the context of
government policy.128 Perhaps a brief, final example will illuminate this
point. Assume Peter is a neutral altruist who wishes to pay so that Paul
has better access to the Grand Canyon. Paul, however, has little desire to
visit the Grand Canyon. An improvement in road conditions to
accommodate for Peter's altruistic feelings would be undesirable for
both Peter and Paul: Paul, because he does not wish to see the Grand
Canyon, would prefer a cash payment in lieu of better roads, and Peter,
who is a neutral altruist, would prefer the action that maximizes Paul's
welfare as it is perceived by Paul. In this sort of situation, government
policies need not account for any altruistic concerns.
By contrast, it appears that altruism is not neutral in the context
of safety improvements. Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow articulated this
idea in the 1960s: "The taste for improving the health of others appears
to be stronger than for improving other aspects of their welfare." 129 Such
intention... By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.").
126. Professors Kenneth Arrow and John Hicks received the Nobel Prize in 1972 "for
their pioneering contributions to general economic equilibrium theory and welfare theory."
Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1972 (Oct. 25, 1972), http://nobelprize.org/
nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/1972/press.html). Professor Gerard Debreu received
the Nobel Prize in 1983 "for his rigorous reformulation of the theory of general
equilibrium." Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges
Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1983 (Oct. 17, 1983),
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_ prizes/economics/laureates/1983/press.html.
127. See HAL R. VARiAN, INTERMEDIATE MIcROEcoNOMIc ANALYSIS: A MODERN
APPROACH 561-64 (5th ed. 1999).
128. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
129. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Aedical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REv. 941, 954 (1963).
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altruism is paternalistically safety-focused. In the case of safety-focused
altruism, Professor Jones-Lee demonstrated that policymakers should
increase expenditures on safety programs to account for altruistic
concerns. 130 Empirical tests have yielded ambivalent results, such that
further research is warranted. Still, the existing evidence supporting the
notion of safety-focused altruism seems to be stronger than the evidence
against it. Professor Jacobsson and associates' 2007 study provides the
clearest confirmation of safety-focused altruism to date.131
Minute mortality risks lead to actual deaths. People die from
lung cancer because, in many areas, pollution levels are too high. Unfor-
tunately, decisions concerning the loss of human life are irreversible. No
person can serve as a perfect substitute for another. Thus, the tendency
to ignore altruism may lead to inefficieitt levels of irreversible outcomes.
One implication is clear: decision makers should be cautious.132 The costs
of overestimating the value of life are preferable to the costs of under-
estimating it.
I therefore advocate increasing the value of statistical life to
account for altruism. Future research will hopefully define the requisite
adjustment more precisely. Until then, Professor Jones-Lee's estimate of
10 to 40 percent serves as an excellent starting point. This recommended
increase implies that the EPA's value of statistical life should be $6.7 to
$8.5 million, not $6.1 million. Properly accounting for the actual value
people place on each other's lives as well as their own will alter many
environmental and public health CBAs in favor of regulation and will
prevent unnecessary deaths.
130. Jones-Lee, supra note 91, at 213.
131. Jacobsson et al., supra note 99.
132. See, e.g., Michael C. Farmer & Alan Randall, The Rationality of a Safe Minimum
Standard, 74 LAND ECON. 287 (1998) ("adherence to standard practices when an irreversible
event is threatened is itself an overly rigid, restrictive, and inconsistent policy program");
John V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779-80 (1967) (stating
that "maximum willingness to pay.. .may be significantly less than the minimum which
would be required to compensate such individuals were they to be deprived in perpetuity
of the opportunity to continue enjoying the natural phenomenon in question" if decisions
are irreversible).
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APPENDIX
In this section, I derive two definitions of the value of statistical
life (VSL) using various assumptions about the nature of altruism.
Section A assumes altruism does not exist-consumers are purely self-
interested. Section B assumes that altruism is entirely safety-focused. As
demonstrated below, the assumption of safety-focused altruism implies
a greater VSL and justifies higher levels of safety expenditures.
A. No Altruism
Theoretical definitions of VSL are often derived using the
concept of expected utility. 133 Consumers attempt to maximize expected
utility, or welfare, subject to personal budget constraints. Let E1SI be the
expected utility of Person 1, a purely self-interested individual, and pi
his probability of death. E1s is a quasi-concave, twice differentiable
function. Further, let USI(c,) be the utility of Person 1 associated with
consumption c, if he is living and ViSI(ci) the utility of consumption if he
is dead. E s' = (I1- Pl) -. U s' (c,) + p, " V ' (c.).
Assuming that the post-mortality utility of consumption is zero,
expected utility can be restated in the following manner:
E ' = (I1- p. ).-U' (c,). (1)
Person 1 faces an income constraint of M,, which can be spent on
consumption or safety improvements:
M, = c1 + TWTPIs (pl), (2)
where TWTPlSI(pl) is Person l's total willingness to pay for the level of
risk. By definition, VSL = I dM /dp 1. Thus, VSL = I dTVVTP 5 1 (p,) /dpi I
because I dM /dpi I = I dTWTPlS1(pl) /dpi I (from Equation 2).
Setting up the Lagrangean
f', = (I1- p.).-U,' (c.) + A -(M. - c - TWTP ' (pl)) , (3)
133. See, e.g, Sherwin Rosen, The Value of Changes in Life Expectancy, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 285, 286 (1988); Alberini, supra note 4, at 784; Alberini et al., supra note 45, at
232.
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yields the following first-order conditions, where )L is the Lagrangean
multiplier:
,SI = dUsl/dc _ A "dOSl'/dc, - A = 0,
fs, = -U s' -2. dTWTPs' I/d =0. (4)
Therefore,
VIS 
U___ I______VSL' = dTWTP S dp, - p )1.3d4 "  (5)
Equation 5 expresses VSL under the assumption that Person 1 is
purely self-interested. This assumption is contained in Equation 1, which
posits that expected utility is exclusively a function of personal
consumption and private mortality risk levels. As noted in the text,
government agencies value public safety improvements with private
WTP estimates. 135 Agencies therefore implicitly adopt Equation l's
assumptions. Accordingly, Equation 5 defines the value of statistical life
as it is currently used in CBA.
B. Safety-focused Altruism
The VSL for safety-focused altruists is derived in a similar
manner. This section assumes that Person 1 is a safety-focused altruist.
Therefore, improvements in the safety of others increase his expected
utility:
ElsA = (1 - A "uSA (C,, P2 (6)
where UsA is a non-increasing function of n persons' death probability,
and n is the number of people in society.
Setting up the Lagrangean
£SA =(1-P).USA (C p2...,p)+A.(M -C1 -TWTpS(p,,...,p)),
(7)
134. C.f Alberini, supra note 4, at 784 (deriving the value of statistical by implicitly
differentiating Equation 1 rather than imposing the budget constraint in Equation 2).
135. Supra text accompanying notes 52-63.
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yields 36 the following VSL:
vsSA S AI U I_ =2p.Z dTW ' Idp 1  (I _pI).a / a SUA/ac
(8)
By assumption, Person 1 is a safety-focused altruist, so
Z aU A ap,
i=2 >0.
aUSA /ac,
Person l's utility decreases as the death risk of others increases.
As a result, VSLsA (from Equation 8) is greater than VSLs (from Equation
5), since dUlSl/dc,=aUSA/ad.137 This demonstrates that VSL is greater
under the assumption of safety-focused altruism than under the
assumption of no altruism, since the second part of Equation 8 would be
positive for an altruist and zero for someone purely self-interested.
Equation 8 defines the value of statistical life that should be used in CBA
if consumers are safety-focused altruists. As noted in the text, Professor
Jones-Lee estimates that Equation 8 is 10 to 40 percent larger than
Equation 5.138
136. The first-order conditions are
fs, = au/ lac. - p, .a s lac, - A = 0, and¢'
nn n
= Zau/ lap, _u -U S ,. aSA lp, - . dTWTPdP I@, = 0-
i=2 i=2 i=1
137. For any person, government agencies' allowance (Equation 6) or disallowance
(Equation 1) of altruism does not affect the marginal utility of personal consumption, so
dUisI/dc=aUisA/adc1.
138. Supra text accompanying notes 91-96.
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